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INTERNATIONAL LAW-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-ARISING UNDER
CLAUSE-FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976-The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that in cases where a
foreign plaintiff brings suit against a foreign sovereign under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 federal courts may con-
stitutionally exercise jurisidiction under article III of the United
States Constitution.
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
On April 21, 1975, Verlinden, B.V., a Dutch corporation with its
principal offices in Amsterdam, entered into a contract with the
federal government of Nigeria to sell cement to Nigeria.' It was
agreed that the law of the Netherlands would govern the contract
and that the International Chamber of Commerce, in Paris,
France, would resolve any disputes between the parties.' The con-
tract also stated that the Nigerian government was to furnish an
irrevocable, confirmed letter of credit for the total purchase price
through an Amsterdam financial institution.3 The Central Bank of
Nigeria, however, provided an unconfirmed letter of credit payable
through Morgan Guaranty Trust Company in New York rather
than the required confirmed letter.4
Verlinden, during August 1975, contracted to purchase the ce-
ment necessary to fill the Nigerian order.5 In mid-September of
1975, the Central Bank of Nigeria unilaterally directed Morgan
Guaranty Trust, as well as its other banks, to amend the letters of
credit that had been issued to cover the cement contracts.6 Follow-
ing the mid-September amendment of its letter of credit, Nigeria
determined to pay only for these cement shipments which had re-
ceived Central Bank approval two months prior to their arrival in
Nigerian ports and, so notified the suppliers.




4. Id. at 1965-66.
5. Id. at 1966.
6. Id.
7. Id. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) for a general background of the events
involved in the Nigerian cement cases. Verlinden was among 68 suppliers who had entered
into 109 cement contracts with Nigeria. Nigeria had overbought cement and the mistake
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Alleging that the Central Bank's action was an anticipatory
breach, Verlinden, basing its claim for jurisdiction on section 2 of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Act)' brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.9 Claiming a lack of personal and subject matter juris-
diction, the Central Bank of Nigeria moved to dismiss.10
The district court held that federal courts may exercise subject
matter jurisdiction under the'Act when a foreign corporation sues
a foreign sovereign." The district court, however, dismissed the
complaint, finding that the Act entitled the Central Bank to sover-
eign immunity.1 2 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
agreed that the Act permits a foreign corporation to bring an ac-
tion in federal court against a foreign sovereign. 3 It held, however,
that such an extension of federal jurisdiction is unconstitutional,
because it exceeds the scope of article 111.14 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari's and reversed, holding that the circuit court had
correctly construed the Act but that federal jurisdiction in such an
action is constitutional.1 6
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, began by
voting that prior to 1952, foreign sovereigns were generally granted
immunity from suit in United States courts upon request by the
became apparent as the country's ports and docking facilities became clogged. As the
amount of cement scheduled to arrive exceeded the country's infrastructure's capacity to
absorb it, Nigeria chose to repudiate its contracts. 647 F.2d at 303-06.
8. 103 S. Ct. at 1966. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1330
(1976). Section 1330 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title
or under any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief
over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has
been made under section 1608 of this title.
Id.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 1966. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp.
1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
10. 103 S. Ct. at 1966.See 488 F. Supp. at 1288.
11. 103 S. Ct. at 1966. See 488 F. Supp. at 1292-93.
12. 103 S. Ct. at 1967. See 488 F. Supp. at 1302.
13. 103 S. Ct. at 1967. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320,
324 (2d Cir. 1981).
14. 103 S. Ct. at 1967. See 647 F.2d at 328-29.
15. 455 U.S. 936 (1982).
16. 103 S. Ct. at 1967.
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State Department.1 7 In 1952, foreign sovereign immunity began to
be restricted pursuant to the Tate Letter' s which announced a new
State Department policy of withdrawing immunity from the com-
mercial acts of foreign states.19 Chief Justice Burger noted that the
policy embodied in the Tate Letter was not law, and that decisions
concerning immunity were, in practice, made by two different
branches of government.20 Since initial responsibility for making
sovereign immunity determinations usually fell on the State De-
partment, its "suggestions" usually ruled. But when foreign na-
tions did not make their request to the State Department, courts
had responsibility to make the determinations. In order to clarify
the confusion which inevitably resulted from this case-by-case ap-
proach to foreign sovereign immunity, Congress, in 1976, passed
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act"' which listed a set of legal
standards to apply to foreign sovereign immunity claims.22 Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Burger, the Act embodies the restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity as enunciated in the Tate Letter. s
Turning to the issue of whether the Act permits foreign plain-
tiffs to sue foreign defendents in federal courts, the Court agreed
with the holdings of the district court and the court of appeals that
the Act granted jurisdiction for such suits.2 The Court noted that
the terms of the Act do not contain any limitation on the citizen-
ship of the plaintiff.2 Reviewing the legislative history of the stat-
ute, the Court found that some of the history could be understood
to support and implicitly limit 2' jurisdiction to suits brought by
17. Id. See text accompanying notes 61-72.
18. 26 1952 Dm'T OF STATE BuLL. 984. The Tate Letter was written by Jack B. Tate,
acting legal advisor to the State Department. The letter was intended to be a policy pro-
nouncement that the State Department would no longer grant immunity automatically to
the commercial acts of foreign sovereigns in the United States. It was the intent of the Tate
Letter to move United States policy from a position of granting absolute immunity to for-
eign sovereigns to a restricted one which grants immunity on a case-by-case basis. 103 S. Ct.
at 1968.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 1968.
20. Id.
21. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891-92,
2894-98 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441, 1604-1611 (1976)).
22. Id. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Hearings on H.R. 11315 before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-35 (1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor, Department of State).
23. 103 S. Ct. at 1968.
24. Id. at 1969.
25. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). See also supra note 8.
26. 103 S. Ct. at 1969. See H.R. Rxp. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
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American citizens.27 Other statements from congressional debate,
however, seem to extend access to the courts to any plaintiff. 8 The
Court observed that Congress was aware of the possibility that a
flood of suits by foreign plaintiffs would turn the federal courts
into international claims courts29 and chose to prevent that result
by requiring some form of substantial contact with the United
States"0 instead of by restricting the class of plaintiffs to United
States citizens.
3 1
The Court then addressed what it viewed as the crucial issue:
whether Congress acted unconstitutionally in extending federal
court jurisdiction to suits in which a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign
government or instrumentality in United States courts.3 2 The
Court examined article III of the Constitution to determine
whether the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by the
Act exceeded that article's grant of jurisdiction.2 The Court stated
that the diversity clause,' which extends judicial power to contro-
versies between citizens of two or more states, foreign states, citi-
zens and subjects, is not broad enough to permit federal courts to
have jurisdiction over actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign
governments as it only grants federal courts jurisdiction in contro-
versies between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states.3 5
The Court then turned to the second clause, the "arising under"
clause" of article III and held that it provides the basis for the
federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction in actions brought by
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1969. See H.R. REP., supra note 26, at 6.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 1969. See H.R. REP., supra note 26, at 13.
29. 103 S. Ct. at 1969. See Hearings on H.R. 11315, supra note 22, at 31 (testimony of
Bruno A. Ristau).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 1970. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (substantial contacts required to
sue in United States courts).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1970. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
32. 103 S. Ct. at 1970.
33. Id. at 1970-73.
34. The diversity clause, a portion of art. III, cl. 2, provides:
Judicial power shall extend to . . . controversies between two or more States; be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 1970. See supra note 34.
36. The arising under clause provides: "Judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties




Chief Justice Burger turned to the early case of Osborne v. Bank
of the United States," to illustrate the broad scope of the "arising
under" clause.3 9 According to the Chief Justice, Osborne reflects
the broadest interpretation of the "arising under" clause to date.4 0
He stated that while it is not necessary in the instant case to pre-
cisely delineate the limits of article III jurisdiction, the very nature
of a suit against a foreign sovereign under the Act raises questions
of substantive federal law at the initiation of the suit and, there-
fore, clearly "arises under" federal law within the meaning of arti-
cle 111.41
Chief Justice Burger then turned to the congressional power
under article I, section 8, clause 942 to prescribe the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino," the Chief Justice stated that the primacy of federal
concerns is clear when actions against foreign sovereigns are pur-
sued in federal courts and, due to its authority over foreign rela-
tions and commerce, Congress' power to determine the circum-
stances under which foreign states can be sued in United States
courts is undisputable."
The Court stated that by enacting a statute which sets guide-
lines for suing foreign governments in United States courts, Con-
gress properly exercised its rights under article I and was promot-
ing the federal interest.4 The Court held that, for the purposes of
article III jurisdiction, an action against a foreign sovereign arises
under federal law.' 7 The Court went further, stating that subject
matter jurisdiction in any action against a foreign sovereign de-
pends upon the existence of one of the specific exceptions to for-
eign sovereign immunity. Therefore, the district courts must, at
the outset of a suit, apply the Act in an action against a foreign
37. 103 S. Ct. at 1970. See supra note 34.
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 1970.
40. Id. at 1971.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 9. This clause grants Congress the power "to constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Id.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
44. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 1971 (citing 376 U.S. at 423-25).
46. Id. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1607
(1976).




Chief Justice Burger discussed the court of appeals' view that,
for article III purposes, a jurisdictional statute can never constitute
the federal law under which an action arises.4 9 According to the
rule found in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,50 for
the purposes of "arising under" jurisdiction, the federal question
involved must appear on the face of the complaint and cannot at-
tach in anticipation of a defense.51 The Chief Justice discussed,
also, the court of appeals' mistaken reliance on Mossman v. Hig-
ginson,5 2 in which the Court held that a statute conferring jurisdic-
tion over suits in which an alien is a party exceeded the scope of
article III if construed to allow an action solely between two
aliens.53 In distinguishing Verlinden from these cases, he noted
that, in addition to exercising its article I power to regulate foreign
commerce, Congress, in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, had
codified an aspect of substantive federal law: the standards con-
trolling the liability of a foreign sovereign in any court in the
United States.5 4 This is quite a different situation from Mossman
which involved a jurisdictional provision of a judiciary statute and
Georgia mortgage foreclosure laws" or Louisville which arose
under a transportation regulation."
Thus the primary purpose of the Act was to serve as a compre-
hensive regulatory statute.57 According to the Court, Congress, in
order to avoid possible conflicting results among the courts, had
purposely attempted to channel suits against foreign sovereigns
into federal courts.58 The Court held that "since every action
against a foreign sovereign necessarily involves application of a
body of substantive federal law,"" the Act's grant of jurisdiction is
48. Id. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1)-
(5), (b)(1)(2) (1976) which detail the specific exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 1972.
50. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
51. See 72 C.J.S. Pleading § 426 (1952).
52. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800).
53. 103 S. Ct. at 1972.
54. Id. at 1973. See H.R. R9P., supra note 26, at 12 which recited the standards set by
the Court in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945), and Ex Parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
55. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 12.
56. 211 U.S. 149 (plaintiffs sued to overturn a federal transportation regulation which
prohibited free railroad passes).
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within the limits of article 111.60
In remanding the case to the court of appeals, the Court noted
that its decision that the Act is in accord with the Constitution did
not terminate the case.6" The Court clearly indicated that subject
matter jurisdiction must exist as well. Therefore, the case was re-
manded to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to consider
whether one of the Act's specific exceptions to immunity applies.
In Verlinden, Chief Justice Burger examined the historical de-
velopment of the concept of foreign sovereign immunity in the
United States. Prior to the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act in 1976 the Court followed two different approaches
to the issue of foreign sovereign immunity.
The first approach originated in The Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Fadden6 2 in which the Court held that United States courts lacked
jurisdiction over an armed ship of a foreign nation found in a
United States port. 3 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
upheld a plea of immunity. Bolstered by an executive branch sug-
gestion, noting that a recognition of immunity was supported by
international law" the Court held that the United States had im-
pliedly waived jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns." This "abso-
lute" approach" was not mandated by the Constitution but,
rather, was a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United
States.67 By the mid-twentieth century, the Court began to de-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1974.
62. 7 U.S. (7 Cranch) 114 (1812).
63. Id. A United States ship en route from Baltimore to Spain was seized by the
French and made into a public vessel of the Napoleonic fleet. The original American owners
of the ship attempted to attach the vessel when it put into port at Philadelphia. The Court
held that a public vessel of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States, coming into
a United States port in a friendly manner, is exempt from the jurisdiction of the United
States.
64. Id. at 137.
65. Id.
66. Under the absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which encompasses both
the government of a foreign state and the individual head of state, a state was exempted in
almost every way from the jurisdiction of other countries unless it voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the foreign court. See G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-42 (3d ed. 1976).
67. 103 S. Ct. at 1967. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (21 How.) 527 (1858). In Beers,
the Court held that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent in its own courts "or in
any other" and called this "an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized na-
tions." Id at 529. See also Principality of Monaco v. Missouri, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), which
held that the states of the union still possess attributes of sovereignty and may not be sued
by foreign states without their consent. According to Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the
Court, "I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided, in these courts, between
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crease its emphasis on international law and deferred to the State
Department to the point where the State Department's suggestions
concerning immunity were almost dispositive6 Thus on the eve of
the 1952 issuance of the Tate Letter,6 9 the United States policy
toward sovereign immunity rested upon the "absolute" theory and
a judicial deference to determinations of the executive branch con-
cerning the status of a foreign sovereign's immunity.70
The Tate Letter marked the rise of the "restrictive" theory of.
foreign sovereign immunity in the United States.7 1 Private or com-
mercial acts of the foreign state or its instrumentalities were not
given protection by this theory. Chief Justice Burger noted in
Verlinden that there have been many problems associated with the
application of the Tate Letter doctrine.7 s Problems often arose
when the foreign government did not request immunity from the
State Department. As a direct result, courts were often left to re-
solve the issue of foreign sovereign immunity having only prior
State Department decisions as guidelines. This resulted in vague
and non-uniform standards being applied by two different govern-
mental branches. 5
an American state and a foreign state, without the consent of the parties." Id. at 323-24.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1968. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), in
which the friendly foreign sovereign was held not immune when the State Department had
refrained from certifying immunity. The Court stated that:
[Ilt is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise or surrender
its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the
executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. In such cases the judicial department
of this government follows the action of the political branch.
Id. at 35. See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Peru held that a friendly foreign sover-
eign should be released as immune from suit when its claim of immunity had been recog-
nized and certified to the court by the Department of State. Id. at 588. The Court also
accepted State Department suggestions to grant foreign sovereign immunity even in a case
that involved the commercial activity of the foreign sovereign. See Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.
S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
The United States approach to foreign sovereign immunity was theoretically based upon
that absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns. The absolute theory, however, remained just
that, a theory, as the courts, in practice, would yield to State Department determinations. It
was precisely this deference of the courts which rendered the theory, as applied, less than
absolute.
69. See supra note 18.
70. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Hearings on H.R. 11315 before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Simultaneous with the transition from the "absolute" to the "re-
strictive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity embodied in the
Tate Letter was the evolution of the concept that the state courts'
freedom of action in deciding foreign sovereign immunity cases was
limited by federal policy. In United States v. Pink,7a a state policy
concerning foreign nationalization was forced to yield to federal
policy as expressed in an executive agreement." The state courts
traditionally deferred to the federal government's power and inter-
ests and dismissed cases against foreign governments which
claimed sovereign immunity.78 The Court in Verlinden also
pointed to Zschernig v. Miller7 9 which precluded state judicial in-
quiry where it would affect the federal government's ability to han-
dle foreign relations.80
In order to clarify the situation and eliminate the confusion and
76. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
77. Id.
78. See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138
N.E. 24 (1923). In Wulfsohn, the New York Court of Appeals declared that it was not com-
petent to review the acts of foreign governments, as to do so would interfere with the federal
government's conduct of foreign affairs. 234 N.Y. at 376, 138 N.E. at 26. See also French
Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923) (French
government not suable in state courts for nonpayment of taxes on private property of the
foreign government); Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876
(1908) (state court has no jurisdiction in a personal injury case brought against a corpora-
tion wholly owned by the King of England); Miller v. Ferrocarrill del Pacifico de Nicaragua,
137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688 (1941) (action for recovery of compensation for legal services ren-
dered to a foreign governmental agency could not be maintained in state court unless the
foreign governmental agency consented to waive its immunity); United States of Mexico v.
Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944) (state courts refused to enforce an order of
attachment against a Mexican state mineral agency where the State Department suggested
immunity); Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 237 N.Y. 150, 142 N.E. 569 (1923)
(suit for value of automobiles confiscated by General Kolchak's anti-Bolshevik, defacto gov-
ernment of Russia during the Russian Civil War dismissed due to immunity of foreign gov-
ernment from suit in state courts without its consent); F.W. Stone Engineering v. Petroleos
Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945) (bank account of an instrumentality of the Mexi-
can government not attachable by creditors as state court has no jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign). In Chemical Natural Resources v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a determina-
tion of immunity by the executive branch of the federal government is conclusive in state
courts. 420 Pa. at 147, 215 A.2d at 877.
79. 389 U.S. 429 (1960). Zschernig, a resident of East Germany and heir of an Ameri-
can citizen who died intestate in Oregon, challenged Oregon probate laws which required an
escheat to Oregon because United States citizens did not have a reciprocal right to take or
hold property in East Germany. The Court held this statute to be an interference in the
federal power over foreign affairs. Id.
80. Id. This decision criticized the Tate Letter saying, "[rjesolution of so fundamental
... [an] issue cannot vary from day to day with the shifting winds of the State Depart-
ment." Id. at 443.
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political pressures caused by the case-by-case approach to the con-
cept of sovereign immunity, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in 1976. By listing a set of legal standards to apply
to immunity claims in actions against foreign states, political sub-
divisions, or instrumentalities, it was hoped that legal grounds
would be the basis for decisions and that due process would be
ensured by its procedures."1
The restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity as enunci-
ated by the Tate Letter is embodied in the Act. Under section 1604
of the Act,82 foreign states are normally immune from the jurisdic-
tion of federal and state courts except as provided in sections
160583 and 1607 of the Act.84 Included among the exceptions are
actions in which the foreign state has impliedly or explicitly
waived its immunity" and actions based on the commercial activi-
ties of the foreign sovereign that are either carried on in the
United States or cause a direct effect in the United States."' The
Act provides that when one of the specific exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity applies, the foreign state shall be liable to the
same extent that any private individual would be under similar cir-
cumstances.8 7 While commercial acts of sovereigns are not given
81. See von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 33 (1978), which concludes that one of the Act's goals is that "[diecisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that ensure due process." Id. at 48.
82. Foreign Sovereign Immunities.Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
83. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976). See
infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
84. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976) (a for-
eign state will not be immune to counterclaims in actions brought by that foreign state,
unless it would have been immune under section 1605).
85. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976)
states a foreign state will not be immune from jurisdiction in acase:
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implica-
tion, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may pur-
port to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.
Id.
86. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
Section 1605(a)(2) states that a foreign state will not be immune from jurisdiction in a case:
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
87. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976) provides
in part: "As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to
immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." Id.
1026 Vol. 22:1017
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immunity, unfortunately, in many situations, the Act is not clear
on what constitutes commercial activity.
88
The Act provides that its standards control in both federal and
state courts;8 9 thus, suits may be brought in either federal or state
courts."e The foreign state has the right to remove civil actions to
federal courts."1 This reflects the importance of taking into consid-
eration diplomatic and political sensitivities which the federal
courts are better prepared to handle.92 It also highlights the neces-
sity of developing a uniform body of law concerning foreign sover-
eign immunity since it is conceivable that, if left to decide these
matters alone, the state courts could reach conclusions that conflict
with the federal executive branch's foreign policy.93 Under section
1330(a) of the Act, any permissible claim may be brought in fed-
eral court. The court, however, may lack subject matter jurisdic-
tion if the claim does not fall into one of the specific exceptions to
the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine.9 4
As noted by the Court, section 1330(a) of the Act is truly "un-
ambiguous" on its face. 95 Limitations on the plaintiff's citizenship
are indicated.96 The legislative history of the Act, however, is not
88. See, e.g., United Euram v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609
(S.D. N.Y. 1978). The Euram court rejected the defendant's contention that certain con-
tracts by the Soviet Union to send performing artists to the United States were in further-
ance of a policy of intercultural exchange and were not commercial activities for the sale of
services. Id. at 611. See also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del.
1978), in which the court held that Pezetel was an entity distinct from the state of Poland
and, as such, could be held liable for antitrust violations in the golf cart industry. Id. at 396-
97. Cf. Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in
Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 239 n.139 (1979), which states
that had the suit been against Poland for its governmental actions no jurisdiction would
have been possible under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) and no cause of action would have been
possible under antitrust laws. Id.
89. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976), pro-
vides that: "[a] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."
Id.
90. Id.
91. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 6, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976), pro-
vides: "(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state . . . may be
removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where the action is pending." Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) also per-
mits a claim to be brought from the outset in federal courts.
92. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
93. 103 S. Ct. at 1969.
94. Id. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)
(1976).
95. 103 S. Ct. at 1969.
96. Id.
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as clear as could be hoped for concerning the limitations on a
plaintiff's citizenship. 97 The Court characterizes the legislative his-
tory as confused and muddled.98 At one point the House Report
states that the Act would give jurisdiction over "any claim with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
under Sections 1605-1607." 9 Another portion of the legislative his-
tory states that the Act's purpose was "to provide when and how
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its enti-
ties." 100 In another instance the Report refers to the increasing
number of disputes between "American citizens" and "foreign
states" 10' and expresses the desire to ensure "our citizens . . . ac-
cess to the courts."'' The Court held that the Act and its legisla-
tive history did not clearly indicate congressional intent as to the
citizenship of prospective plaintiffs under the Act and that it did
not necessarily reveal an intent to limit jurisdiction under the Act
to actions brought by United States citizens or domiciliaries. 05
Congress had taken into account the danger of opening the federal
courts to a flood of potential foreign plaintiffs by enacting provi-
sions which required substantial contact with the United States
rather than by restricting the class of potential plaintiffs.0 4 Some
commentators speculate that suits against foreign sovereigns in
United States courts may expand as socialist countries maintain
that sovereign states are absolutely immune from jurisdiction of
other nations' courts.'05
The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, highlighted the com-
plexity of the "arising under" problem in Verlinden.' 6 The court
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See H.R. REP. supra note 26, at 3.
loo. Id.
101. Id. at 6-7.
102. Id. at 6.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 1970.
104. See Hearings on H.R. 11315, supra note 22, at 31. See also Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
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(1973). See also East European Domestic Int'l Sales v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. N.Y.
1979), in which suit would have been barred in Romania but was permitted under the direct
effect language of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) which the court held required an examination of
defendant's contacts with the United States in connection with the transaction. Id. at 388.
Thus, the potential exists for the ideological conflicts between capitalist and socialist gov-
ernments to enter the courtroom in the form of legal arguments and become crucial to the
court's decision.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1970-72. It should be noted that the correct interpretation of the
meaning of the phrase "arising under" has been the subject of much scholarly dispute.
1028 Vol. 22:1017
1984 Recent Decisions 1029
of appeals held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was
merely a jurisdictional grant10 7 and, as such, clashed with the well-
known rule that a jurisdictional statute is not enough to meet the
requirements of the "arising under" clause of the Constitution."8
The Court's analysis of the Verlinden problem quite percep-
tively noted that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is more
than a jurisdictional statute; it is a comprehensive framework gov-
erning the liability and immunity of foreign sovereigns in United
States courts.109 Prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, ju-
dicial doctrine and State Department determinations controlled
the subject of foreign sovereign immunity. " The intent of Con-
gress, however, was to codify this judicial doctrine and apply it as
an aspect of substantive federal law. 1 Thus, in practice, the Act,
while substantive in nature, functions in a manner akin to a juris-
dictional statute."' The court underscored the fact that the simi-
Under some theories the Verlinden decision would have been a foregone conclusion. See
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953). For
a viewpoint that goes even further, see Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of
the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONnTMP. PRODS. 216 (1948).
107. 647 F.2d at 327 (2d Cir. 1981). See 103 S. Ct. at 1972.
108. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), in which the
Court interpreted the "arising under" clause to mean that a suit arises under article III only
when the complaint shows that it is based on the Constitution. Id. at 152. Thus under this
rule, the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, the plaintiff must show that his cause of action
arises under federal law or the constitution, not merely that the plaintiff anticipates a de-
fense and alleges that the defense is invalid under federal law or the Constitution. See also
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), in which
Justice Frankfurter stated that federal jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause, while
limited to federal questions, is so flexible that Congress may confer it whenever there exists
in the background a federal policy that might be challenged. Id. at 482 (Frankfurter J.,
dissenting). Justice Frankfurter's dissent also featured a thorough discussion of the "arising
under" clause. Id. at 460-82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. 103 S. Ct. at 1973. See H.R. REP., supra note 26, at 12.
110. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text for discussion.
111. See Comment, "Arising Under," Verlinden, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 1039, 1054-55
(1982); and Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, 68 U. VA. L. REv. 893 (1982) which conclude that the Act is distinct from exclu-
sively jurisdictional statutes due to its substantive principles of federal law.
112. See Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D. N.Y. 1978)
in which the court, in discussing the substantive and jurisdictional provisions of the Act
stated:
The Act's central feature is its specification of categories of actions for which foreign
states are not entitled to claim the sovereign immunity from American court jurisdic-
tion otherwise granted to such states. These exceptions are contained not in the sec-
tions of the Act which describe the grounds on which jurisdiction may be obtained,
however, but are phrased as substantive acts for which foreign states may be found
liable by American courts. This effects an identity between substance and procedure
in the Act, which means that a court faced with a claim of immunity from jurisdiction
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larity is deceptive by stressing that in order to apply the substan-
tive standards of the Act the court hearing an FSIA claim must, at
the outset, inquire whether any of the Act's exceptions apply. If
they do not, the plaintiff's claim will be barred by the substantive
law of the Act.1" It is this initial determination which led the court
of appeals to hold that the Act was essentially jurisdictional in na-
ture.114 It is important to remember that the congressional intent
to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts in suits involving foreign
sovereigns was to divert such suits away from the state courts so
that the potential for conflicting results among the state and fed-
eral courts would be reduced. 15 The Chief Justice was perceptive
in holding that application of the Act invokes "arising under" arti-
cle III jurisdiction because the application of the Act, a substantive
body of federal law, is inherent in every foreign sovereign immu-
nity action, due to the strong federal interests present.116 Federal
must engage ultimately in a close examination of the underlying cause of action in
order to decide whether the Plaintiff may obtain jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. at 851.
In Yessenin-Volpin, Alexander Yessenin-Volpin, "a persistent defender of the civil and
human liberties of the Russian people," sought damages for libel against the TASS Agency
and Novosti Press Agency for having written and published allegedly defamatory articles in
Sowjetunion Heute and Krasnaya Zvezda, periodicals which are distributed in the United
States. Id. at 850-51.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
114. 647 F.2d at 324-25.
115. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text. See also Note, Suits by Foreigners
Against Foreigners in U.S. Courts: A Selective Expansion of Jurisdiction, 90 YALE L.J.
1861 (1981) which noted that from the passage of the Act to 1981 only one suit was brought
in state courts, Gittler v. German Information Center, 95 Misc. 2d 788, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600
(1978). While suits against foreign sovereigns may be few in number they are important
since they often involve large sums of money. Verlinden involved a claim for $4.5 million.
See, e.g., Ipitrade International S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824
(D.D.C. 1978) which involved $9 million. Id. at 825.
116. Several cases involving foreign plaintiffs and foreign sovereign defendants have
discussed the strong federal interest inherent in FSIA suits. For example, in Letelier v. Re-
public of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980), afl'd on remand, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C.
1980), plaintiff's husband, the former Chilean ambassador, was killed when a bomb ex-
ploded in his car while he was en route to work. Plaintiff alleged that the bomb was planted
at the direction of the Republic of Chile and its intelligence agency. Chile contended that
the court had no subject matter jurisdiction, claiming immunity under the FSIA on the
grounds that political assassinations are exempt due to their public, governmental character.
Chile's claim of immunity was denied. Strong federal and foreign' policy interests are in-
volved in such cases not only due to diplomatic concerns, but, more importantly, because
strong federal interests arise when a successful foreign plaintiff attempts.to enforce his judg-
ment by attaching the foreign sovereign's assets in the United States. Id. at 669. See Lete-
lier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), which arose when Mrs. Lete-
lier, as a judgment creditor, moved for appointment of a receiver to attach property of the
Chilean National Airlines in order to satisfy the judgment in the earlier Letelier case. Cf.
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interests are particularly important, not only because the existence
of sovereign immunity depends on the interpretation of substan-
tive federal law, the Act, but also because complications may arise
when a victorious foreign plaintiff seeks to enforce a judgment
against the foreign sovereign by attaching the sovereign's assets in
the United States.' 17 Thus, the Act has, in a sense, merged the con-
cepts of jurisdiction and immunity since under the terms of the
Act jurisdiction depends on whether the facts meet one of the
Act's specific exceptions from immunity.
The Act, however, poses an interesting problem which the
Verlinden opinion did not reach. This problem is a troublesome
lack of symmetry.
The Act, according to Verlinden, permits foreign corporations to
bring suit in United States courts against foreign sovereigns, even
when the complaint does not state a federal question. The lack of
symmetry arises when one considers that a foreign sovereign would
not be able to bring an identical suit in federal courts against a
foreign defendant. This latter instance is not covered by the Act's
provisions which grant jurisdiction, and does not meet any of the
requirements of article III jurisdiction.
Thus, while the FSIA situation is neither ideal, nor the most
clearly articulated intellectual concept, in light of "arising under"
considerations, the Court's decision in Verlinden is the best that
could be made, given the complexities of foreign sovereign immu-
nity, international political considerations, the need for uniformity
of decision, and the interests of justice.
Joseph S. Bielecki
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) which construed the Alien Tort Claims
Act to allow a foreigner to sue the former head of the Peruvian secret police in the United
States federal courts for torture inflicted in Peru since this promotes American human
rights policy. Id.
117. See supra note 116.
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